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THE DEFINITIONAL SCOPE OF AN
INTRINSIC UTILITARIAN FUNCTION
UNDER THE 1976 COPYRIGHT ACT:
ONE MAN'S USE IS ANOTHER
MAN'S ART
STEPHEN LANGS*

INTRODucnON

Under the 1976 Copyright Act ("1976 Act"),l "pictorial,
graphic, [or] sculptural works"2 are proper subject matter warrant
ing copyright protection. 3 The designs of useful articles,4 however,
are not copyrightable. s The exception to this exception, otherwise
known as the question of separability,6 is that useful articles enjoy
* At the time of publication, this article was being considered in the Nathan
Burkan Memorial Writing Competition.
1. 17 V.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1996).
2. Id. § 101.
"Pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works" include two-dimensional and three
dimensional works of fine, graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and
art reproductions, maps, globes, charts, diagrams, models, and technical draw
ings, including architectural plans. Such works shall include works of artistic
craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their mechanical or utilitarian as
pects are concerned . . . .
Id.
3. See id. § 102(a)(5).
4. See id. § 101 ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic utilitarian func
tion that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to convey information.
An article that is normally a part of a useful article is considered a 'useful article.' ").
5. See id.
[T]he design of a useful article, as defined in this section, shall be considered a
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work only if, and only to the extent that, such
design incorporates pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features that can be identi
fied separately from, and are capable of existing independently of, the utilita
rian aspects of the article.
Id.; see also OddzOn Prod., Inc. v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 349 (D.C. Cir. 1991) ("Congress
excluded the design of useful articles from the realm of copyright ....").
6. For an examination on the issue of separability, see Raymond M. Polakovic,
Comment, Should the Bauhaus Be in the Copyright Doghouse? Rethinking Conceptual
Separability, 64 V. COLO. L. REv. 871 (1993). See also Ralph S. Brown, Design Protec
tion: An Overview, 34 VCLA L. REv. 1341 (1987); Robert C. Denicola, Applied Art
and Industrial Design: A Suggested Approach to Copyright in Useful Articles, 67 MINN.
143
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copyright protection to the extent that pictorial, graphic, or sculp
tural features can exist independently of, and separately from the
utilitarian aspects of the article. 7
Consequently, if an article seeking copyright protection is de
fined as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work, the article is copy
rightable except for its mechanical or utilitarian aspects. 8 If an
article is defined as a useful article, then its design is not copyright
able except to the extent that copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural features can be identified and are capable of existing in
dependently of and separately from the article. 9 The question pre
ceding any discussion concerning the copyright ability of an article is
determining whether the article seeking protection is properly de
fined as a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work or as a useful article.
This question was recently addressed by the Fourth Circuit in
Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co.,
Inc. 10 In that case, the court was faced with the question of
"whether animal mannequins used by taxidermists to mount animal
skins [were] copyrightable."ll Before deciding the issue of
copyrightability, however, the court had to determine whether the
mannequins were "useful articles" or "sculptural works" as defined
by the 1976 Act.12 The court found that the principal utilitarian
aspect of the animal mannequins was their portrayal of animal ex
pressions. 13 The animal mounts were properly defined as sculptural
works, and the court held that the artistic "portrayal of the animal's
body expression" was copyrightable. 14
Distinguishing pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works from use
ful articles must be based on the purposes of copyright law. The
ultimate goal of copyright law is to foster the creation and dissemi
nation of intellectual works and to promote the growth of learning
and culture for the public welfare.1 5 "The Constitution, [under art.
L. REv. 707 (1983); Rebecca Ishaq Foster, Comment, Protect the Bastard Child of the
Arts: Copyright Protection for Theatrical Costumes, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 431 (1993); Gary
S. Raskin, Comment, Copyright Protection for Useful Articles: Can the Design of an
Object Be Conceptually Separated from the Object's Function?, 33 SANTA CLARA L.
REv. 171 (1993).
7. See 17 U.S.c. § 101. See supra note 4 for the definition of useful articles.
8. See 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 102(a)(5).
9. See id. § 101.
10. 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996).
11. [d. at 491.
12.

[d.

13.
14.
15.

See id. at 494.
Id.
See, e.g., Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., Inc., 471 U.S. 539,
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I, § 8, cl. 8], does not establish copyrights, but provides that Con
gress shall have the power to grant such rights if it thinks best. Not
primarily for the benefit of the author, but primarily for the benefit
of the public, such rights are given. "16 By securing "the award[s]
due them for their contribution[s] to society," granting authors ex
clusive rights in their works for a limited time is a means to promot
ing the growth of learning and culture for the public welfare
because "copyright stimulates their creation and dissemination of
intellectual workS."17
Courts are in the unenviable position of striking a balance be
tween protecting the works of authors and promoting the public
interest. 18 Some commentators note that if a balance cannot be
struck between protecting original expression and promoting public
progress, then it is wiser to err in favor of over-protection. 19 Unfor
tunately, broadening the scope of protection when unnecessary un
dermines the goals of copyright because it comes at the expense of
public learning and welfare.2o
This paper addresses the issue of how courts should determine
the appropriate analytical starting point before defining the scope
of copyright protection afforded any particular article. Under a
"primary functional significance" analysis, the utilitarian functions
of an article seeking copyright protection are weighed against its
aesthetic functions. If aesthetic qualities are found to be primary,
then the article is properly defined as a pictorial, graphic, or sculp
tural work. Conversely, if utilitarian functions are primarily signifi
cant, then the article is properly defined as a useful article subject
to the question of separability.
Apportioning the relative weight of aesthetic functionality and
utilitarian functionality necessarily occurs on an ad hoc basis. How
ever, the purpose of copyright is to promote the arts and sciences
546 (1985); Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417,450 (1984);
REpORT OF THE REGISTER OF COPYRIGHTS ON THE GENERAL REVISION OF THE U.S.
COPYRIGlIT LAW 3-6 (1961) [hereinafter REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION].
16. H.R. No. 2222, 60th Congo (1908).
17. REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION, supra note 15, at 3-6.
18. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (the purpose of copyright law is "[t]o promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries").
19. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 6, at 209-10.
20. See, e.g., REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION, supra note 15, at 3-6 (the sec
ondary purpose to fostering and creating intellectual works for public welfare is re
warding authors for their works; however, "the interests of authors must yield to []
public welfare where [these interests] conflict").
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for public welfare. Thus, the appropriate scope of copyright should
be determined based on the specific article seeking protection and
not on a general categorization of the article. z1 Whether particular
articles possess an intrinsic 'utilitarian function beyond portraying
appearance or conveying information is a question of fact. Rather
than favoring over-protection and holding that certain articles do
not possess an intrinsic utilitarian function beyond portraying ap
pearance or conveying information a~ a matter of law,2z a case-by
case analysis to determine "usefulness" protects the interests of au
thors, the public welfare, and establishes clearer guidelines to ad
dress future issues of this nature.
I.

BACKGROUND

Useful articles are articles having an intrinsic utilitarian func
tion beyond portraying their oWn appearance or conveying infor
mation. z3 They need not be complex or highly technical devices
like cars or computers. Useful articles "can be as mundane a tech
nology as a hand-cranked pencil sharpener. "Z4 SO long as articles
retain "an intrinsic utilitarian function,"z5 they are defined as useful
and their designs are not copyrightable unless particular elements
of their designs satisfy the separability test. The purpose. of this
paper is to explore the various interpretations of "intrinsic utilita
rian function" and to examine the metes and bounds defining the
judicial scope of what constitute useful articles. z6 This paper ana
lyzes existing statutory language and judicial interpretations of that
language, and asserts that the appropriate starting point in defining
the proper scope of copyright. protection is determined under a
"primary functional significance" -analysis. Accorc;iingly, a brIef re
view of the development of copyright protection afforded useful ar
ticles is necessary in order to determine the proper definitional
scope of intrinsic utilitarian functions.
21. See, e.g., Note, Protection for the Artistic Aspects of Articles of Utility, 72
L. REV. 1520, 1525-26 (1959); cf Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d 970
(6th Cir. 1983).
22. See, e.g., Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 972-73.
23. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1996) ("A 'useful article' is an article having an intrinsic
utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the appearance of the article or to
convey information.").
24. Polakovic, supra note 6, at 872 (citing Ted Arnold, Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259
F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966)).
25. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (emphasis added).
26. See infra Part I.B.2.
HARV.
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The Development of Copyright Protection Concerning Useful
Articles

In 1903, the Supreme Court decided' Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing CO.27 In Bleistein, the Court was faced with the
question of whether artistic works are copyrightable when their
principal functions "are among the useful arts."28 At issue was a
painted circus advertisement the defendant had copied. 29 The
plaintiff sued for infringement. 3o The defendant argued that adver
tisements were not proper subject matter warranting copyright pro
tection. 31 The Court held that the advertisement's utilitarian
function, i.e., promoting the circus "to increase trade and to help
make money," did not bar copyright protection. 32 Under Bleistein,
articles serving principally utilitarian functions such as advertise
ments may be proper subject matter for copyright protection. Un
fortunately, the Court did not define the extent or scope of such
protection. Consequently, the answer to this question is answered
by examining the evolution of protection for useful articles follow
ing Bleistein.
1.

Examining Protection Prior to the 1976 Act

The Copyright Act of 1909 ("1909 Act")33 was enacted shortly
after Bleistein. The 1909 Act provided copyright protection to
"[w]orks of art."34 In implementing the 1909 Act, however, the
Copyright Office35 could not determine whether protection was
27. .188 U.S. 239 (1903). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 174, for a further dis
cussion of Bleistein.
28. Bleistein, 188 U.S. at 249.
29. See id. at 242.
30. See id. at 240.
31. See id.
32. [d. at 251.
33. 17 U.S.c. §§ 1-216 (1909), amended by 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1978) (current
version at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1996)). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 174, for a
further discussion of the 1909 Act.
34. 17 U.S.c. § 5(g) (1909), amended by 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1978) (current ver
sion at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1996)); see also Denicola, supra note 6, at 710.
Among the items eligible for copyright under the 1909 Act were those speci
fied in section 5(g) .... With the deletion of all reference to the "fine arts," a
major barrier to copyright in the design of useful objects apparently fell. No
logic could demonstrate that crystal wine glasses, pearl rings, or even hand
some radio cabinets were not "works of art."
[d. (footnotes omitted).
35. Under the direction of the Register of Copyrights, the Copyright Office is
charged with all administrative functions and duties under the 1976 Copyright Act. See
17 U.S.c. § 701 (1996). The Register of Copyrights is responsible for establishing and
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properly available to applied works of art, i.e., useful articles, or
only to works of fine art. The Copyright Office was accepting utili
tarian objects for copyright registration while adopting regulations
rejecting such registrations. 36 Ultimately, however, the Copyright
Office promulgated regulation 202.8 in 1948 which defined works of
art to include "'works of artistic craftsmanship, insofar as their
form but not their mechanical or utilitarian aspects are con
cerned.'''37 Hence, under regulation 202.8, the designs of useful
works of art were proper subject matter warranting copyright
protection. 38
In Mazer v. Stein,39 the Supreme Court endorsed regula
tion 202.8 and held that aesthetic and artistic elements subsisting in
useful articles are copyrightable. At issue in Mazer were identical
copies of lamp bases sculpted in the form of Balinese Dancers. 40
The respondents had registered the lamp bases for copyright as
"works of art"41 under the 1909 Act separately from the mechanical
parts of the lamp.42 Ignoring the functional aspect of their intended
use as lamp bases, the Court held that original works of art do not
cease to be copyrightable as works of art when they are incorpo
rated into the designs of useful articles. 43 The lamp bases were de
serving of copyright protection because they represented a form of
promulgating regulations to administer the Copyright Act. See id. § 702. See also Ras
kin, supra note 6, at 174-75 for a further discussion of the Copyright Office's promul
gated regulations.
36. "In a 1910 regulation defining 'works of art,' the Copyright Office restricted
the newly established classification to 'the so-called fine arts,' expressly excluding
'[p]roductions of the industrial arts utilitarian in purpose and character.'" Denicola,
supra note 6, at 710 (quoting COPYRIGHT OFFICE, RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE
REGISTRATION OF CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT, BULL. No. 15, § 12(g) (1910». However,
the Copyright Office amended this regulation in 1917 to allow registration of "artistic
drawings notwithstanding they may afterwards be utilized for articles of manufacture."
37 C.F.R. § 201.4(7) (1917); see also Raskin, supra note 6, at 175; Shira Perlmutter,
Conceptual Separability and Copyright in the Designs of Useful Articles, 37 J. COpy
RIGHT SOC'Y 339, 342-43 (1990).
37. Raskin, supra note 6, at 175 (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949».
38. The 1976 Act, contrary to the 1909 Act, does not refer to "works of art" as
proper subject matter warranting copyright protection. This classification was aban
doned in favor of a new category referring to "pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works."
17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5) (1996).
39. 347 U.S. 201 (1954). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 175-76 for a further
discussion of Mazer.
40. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202.
41. Note that the 1976 Act abandoned the term "works of art" in favor of "picto
rial, graphic, and sculptural works." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(5).
42. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 202.
43. See id. at 218.
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artistic craftsmanship and were not part of the mechanical or utilita
rian aspects of the lamp.44 The Court concluded that there was
"nothing in the copyright statute to support the argument that the
intended use or use in industry of an article eligible for copyright
bars or invalidates its registration. "45
Responding to the Court's decision in Mazer, the Copyright
Office promulgated regulation 202.10. 46 This regulation embodied
the principle, affirmed in Mazer, that commercial use does not dis
qualify an otherwise registrable work of art from copyright protec
tion. 47 However, in attempting to define the eligibility of artistically
shaped utilitarian articles for copyright protection, regulation
202.1O(c) stated that if "the sole intrinsic function of an article is its
utility, the fact that it is unique and attractively shaped will not
qualify it as a [protect able] work of art."48 The Copyright Office
amended this regulation three years later by granting protection to
those artistic features of useful articles that "can be identified sepa
rately and are capable of existing independently as" works of art. 49
"It was this amended version of the regulation which made separa
bility a crucial element in determining which aspects of, and to what
extent useful articles are protected."50 In sum, regulation 202.10
denied copyright protection to useful articles incorporating aes
thetically pleasing designs incapable of existing independently as
protectable works of art under the 1909 Act.
Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer51 is a good example of regulation
202.10's application. The question on appeal was whether the over
all shape of a utilitarian object is an article eligible for copyright.52
In Esquire, the manufacturer of outdoor lighting fixtures sought
copyright protection for the overall shape of its fixtures as a "work
44. See id.; cf. 37 C.F.R. § 202.8 (1949).
45. Mazer, 347 U.S. at 218.
46. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10 (1957). See also Raskin, supra note 6, at 176, for a
further discussion of section 202.10.
47. See 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(b) ("The registrability of a work of art is not affected
by the intention of the author as to the use of the work.").
48. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1O(c) (amended 1960).
49. 37 C.F.R. § 202.1O(c) (1960).
50. Raskin, supra note 6, at 176 (footnote omitted). See also supra note 6 for a
list of authorities discussing and examining the difficulties associated with applying the
separability test to useful articles.
51. 414 F. Supp. 939 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d 796 (D.C. Cir. 1978). For an
in-depth discussion of Esquire, see Aleksandra A. Miziolek, Casenote, Copyright
Law-Copyright Protection for Industrial Designs Under the 1976 Copyright Acts, 25
WAYNE L. REV. 923 (1979).
52. See Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d 796, 798, 804 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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of art" under the 1909 Act. 53 Although the case was decided in
1978, the articles in question were subject to the 1909 Act and ac
companying regulations because the 1976 Act was not effective un
til January 1, 1978. 54 .
The Register of Copyrights refused Esquire's application for
copyright protection. 55 The Register cited regulation 202.10(c) as
precluding registration of the designs of utilitarian articles, such as
lighting fixtures, "when all of the design· elements ... are directly
related to the useful functions of the article."56 According to the
Register, the lighting fixtures or their overall shape did not contain
"'elements, either alone or in combination, which are capable of
independent existence as a copyrightable'" work of art under the
1909 Act. 57
Esquire argued that it designed its lighting fixtures with the in
tent of creating modern art.58 Under regulation 202.10, Esquire
maintained, "that as long as the overall shape of a utilitarian article
embodies dual intrinsic functions-aesthetic and utilitarian-that
shape may qualify for registration. "59 Hence, Esquire contended
that the sole intrinsic function of its lighting fixtures was not utility;
rather, they also possessed aesthetic functions properly warranting
copyright protection. 60 The district court agreed with Esquire and
found that the lighting fixture's "sole intrinsic function" was not
utility in that the fixtures served "both to decorate and illumi
nate. "61 The court held that the lighting fixtures were proper sub
ject matter warranting copyright protection. 62 However, after
acknowledging that the 1976 Act was not applicable to the instant
question, the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Co
lumbia Circuit reversed the lower court's decision and denied copy
right registration based on an examination of the Act's statutory
language and legislative history.63
See id. at 798-99.
See id. at 799 n.8; Raskin, supra note 6, at 177.
See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 798..
56. Id. (quoting 37 C.F.R. § 202.10(c) (1976». "Form follows function, in the
credo of one school of art." Id. at 807 (Leventhal, J.,. concurring).
57. Id. at 798 (footnote omitted).
58. See id. at 800.
59. Id. at 804.
60. See id. at 800, 804.
61. Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 414 F. Supp. 939, 941 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
62. See id.
63. See Esquire, 591 F.2d at 799 n.8, 802-05.
53.
54.
55.
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Examining Protection After the 1976 Act

Whereas regulation 202.10(c) defined articles as useful if their
"sole intrinsic function" was their utility, the 1976 Copyright Act
denies copyright protection to articles "even if [their] sole intrinsic
function is not utility."64 Under the 1976 Act, articles are defined
as useful if such articles possess "an intrinsic utilitarian function."65
Hence, "articles which are functional only in their appearance have
an intrinsic aesthetic function [and are copyrightable], whereas ob
jects which have a use beyond mere appearance have an intrinsic
utilitarian function [and are not copyrightable]."66
The 1976 Act broadly defines an article as "useful" and not
subject to copyright protection if it possesses any intrinsic use or
function beyond merely portraying the appearance of the article or
conveying information. Courts have generally interpreted any use
beyond portraying appearance or conveying information under the
1976 Act as an intrinsic utilitarian function. 67 Under these interpre
tations, for example, Esquire could not have argued that its lighting
fixtures were copyrightable sculptural works because they pos
sessed an additional use, i.e., to illuminate, beyond merely portray
ing appearance or conveying information. This additional use
would have qualified the lighting fixtures as useful articles under
the 1976 Act.
64. Mark A. LoBello, The Dichotomy Between Anistic Expression and Industrial
Design: To Protect or Not to Protect, 13 WHITTIER L: REv. 107, 127 (1992).
65. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1996) (emphasis added) ("A 'useful article' is an article hav
ing an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the iiPpearance of the
article or to convey information.").
66. Raskin, supra note 6, at 208. Courts have generally interpreted any use be
yond portraying appearance as an intrinsic 'utilitarian function. See, e.g., Mazer v. Stein,
347 U.S. 201 (1954); Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239 (1903);
Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., 912 F.2d 663 (3d Cir. 1990); Whimsicality,
Inc. v. Rubie's COstume Co., 891 F.2d 452 (2d Cir. 1989); Brandir Int'!, Inc. v. Cascade
Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987); Carol Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover
Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985); Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir.
1984); Fabrica Inc. v. El Dorado Corp., 697 F.2d 890 (9th Cir. 1983); Norris Indus. v.
International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696 F.2d 918 (11th Cir. 1983); Kieselstein-Cord v. Ac
cessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980); Esquire, Inc. v. Ringer, 591 F.2d
796 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622 (E.D. Mich.
1981), rev'd, 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983); Ted Arnold Ltd. v. Silvercraft Co., 259 F.
Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Recently, however, some courts have recognized that simply because certain arti
cles possess utilitarian functions does not mean such functions are intiinsic to those
articles. See, e.g., Poe, 745 F.2d at 1241-42; Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973-74.
67. See supra note 66 and cases cited therein.
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Considering the legislative history of the 1976 Act, the court in
Esquire observed that
[i]n deleting the modifier "sole" from the language taken from
§ 202.10(c), the draftsmen of the 1976 Act must have concluded
that the definition of "useful article" would be more precise with
out this term. Moreover, Congress may have concluded that lit
eral application of the phrase "sole intrinsic function" would
create an unworkable standard. For as one commentator has ob
served, "[t]here are no two-dimensional works and few three-di
mensional objects whose design is absolutely dictated by
utilitarian considerations. "68

The principal provisions of regulation 202.10(c) are retained in
present statutory language.69 Eligible articles warranting copyright
protection under the 1909 Act were defined as "works of art."70
The 1976 Act replaced this term with a more precise definition of
68. Esquire, 591 F.2d at 804 (quoting Comment, Copyright Protection for Mass
Produced, Commercial Products: A Review of the Developments Following Mazer v.
Stein, 38 U. Du. L. REv. 807, 812 (1971».
The 1976 Act defines pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features as "works of fine,
graphic, and applied art, photographs, prints and art reproductions, maps, globes,
charts, diagrams, models, and technical drawings, including architectural plans. Such
works shall include works of artistic craftsmanship insofar as their form but not their
mechanical or utilitarian aspects are concerned ...." 17 U.S.c. § 101.
The inspiration for this definition stems from Copyright Office Regulation
202.10(c) under the 1909 Act. See supra notes 46-65 for a discussion of 37 C.F.R.
§ 202.10(c) (1957). Section 101 and § 202.1O(c) are virtually identical.
The only difference is that the 1909 Regulation would have denied copyright
to an attractive article only if "the sole intrinsic function" of the article is util
ity. The 1976 Act, however, would deny copyright to the shape of a utilitarian
article even if its sole intrinsic function is not utility. Thus, "a work is a 'useful
article' and therefore denied copyright for its shape as such, if it has 'an intrin
sic utilitarian function.''' ... The narrow avenue of potential protection under
the [1976 Act] is based on the nature of the design. Even if the article has
aesthetic features, the separability test will provide protection only to those
aspects that can actually be identified independent of any functional
considerations.
LoBello, supra note 64, at 127 (quoting 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIMMER ON COpy·
RIGHT § 2.08[B] (1988». Unfortunately, the legislative history of the 1976 Act does not
account for this statutory change between "the sole intrinsic function" of an article and
"an intrinsic function." It is unclear whether Congress intended to narrow the scope of
protection afforded useful articles or whether this change in language was merely an
oversight in drafting § 101.
69. See 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1994); Miziolek, supra note 51, at 926 n.28 ("Regu
lations 202.10(c) and 202.10(a) were both impliedly repealed by the 1976 Copyright
Act") (citing 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-810 (1976».
70. See Copyright Act of 1909, 17 U.S.C. §§ 1-216, amended by 17 U.S.c. §§ 101
810 (1978) (current version at 17 U.S.c. §§ 101-1101 (1994».
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"pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works."71 This new definition in
cludes useful articles only to the extent that they embody features
qualifying as pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works that are capable
of existing independently of, and separately from the article.72
In short, the extent to which articles serving utilitarian func
tions may properly receive copyright protection under the 1976 Act
depends on whether such articles are defined as useful. The designs
of useful articles are copyrightable insofar as pictorial, graphic, or
scuipturaF3 features "can be identified separately ... and are capa
ble of existing independently" of the utilitarian aspects of such arti
cles.74 Accordingly, the development and evolution of what
constitutes an intrinsic utilitarian function must be considered in or
der to determine a definition for useful articles.
B.

How Intrinsic Utilitarian Functions Are Defined

The 1976 Act fails to articulate clearly whether and when utili
tarian functions serve as intrinsic utilitarian functions of useful arti
cles. The Act does not define what may constitute "intrinsic
utilitarian functions." It is necessary, then, to examine the legisla
tive history of the 1976 Act for additional explanation and further
guidance.
1.

Legislative History

The 1976 House Report ("Report") observes that the
copyright ability of pictorial, graphic, and sculptural works does not
mean that protection stems from "artistic taste, aesthetic value, or
intrinsic quality."75 Much of the Report's introduction reviews the
historical development of protection for useful articles.76 Starting
with Mazer, the Report acknowledges "that protection subsists de
71. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1994).
72. See id.
73. Note that under the 1909 Act the term used to define copyrightable articles
was "works of art." See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text.
74. 17 U.S.c. § 101.
75. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659,
5667. Copyright protection does not depend on an article's artistic value. In his famous
copyright caveat, Justice Holmes warned that "[i]t would be a dangerous undertaking
for persons trained only in the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of
pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits." Bleistein v.
Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903). See also Raskin, supra note 6,
at 178-80 for a further discussion on the legislative reports of the 1976 Copyright Act.
76. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 47-50, 53, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at
5660-63,5666-67. See also supra Part I.A for a discussion on the development of copy
right protection concerning useful articles.
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spite factors such as mass production, commercial exploitation, and
the potential availability of design patent protection."77 Purporting
to draw "as clear a line as possible between copyrightable works of
applied art and uncopyrighted works of industrial design," the Re
port states that Congressional intent is not to afford copyright pro
tection to the shapes of industrial articles even though they may be
aesthetically pleasing. 78 Hence,
although the shape of an industrial product may be aesthetically
satisfying and valuable, [Congress'] intention is not to offer it
copyright protection under the bill. Unless the shape of an auto
mobile, airplane, ladies' dress, food processor, television set, or
any other industrial product contains some element that, physi
cally or conceptually, can be identified as separable from the util
itarian aspects of that article, the design would not be
copyrighted under the hill. The test of separability and indepen
dence from "the utilitarian aspects of the article" does not de
pend upon the nature of the design-that is, even if the
appearance of an article is determined by esthetic (as opposed to
functional) considerations, only elements, if any, which can be
identified separately from the useful article as such are
copyrightable. 79

The above language does not establish any guidelines to deter
mine whether something qualifies as a useful article. The Report
merely reiterates a familiar definition, in that, useful articles are ar
ticles having an intrinsic utilitarian function that does more than
simply port!ay appearance or convey information.8o Though the
Report cites examples of "utilitarian articles such as textile fabrics,
wallpaper, containers, and the like," e.g., automobiles, planes, and
industrial products,81 nowhere does the Report specify what consti
tutes an intrinsic utilitarian function.
Unfortunately, the line between copyrightable pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural works and uncopyrightable industrial designs
is not so clear as to permit an immediate understanding of when
articles seeking copyright protection are considered useful for copy
right purposes. The task of ascertaining this distinction falls to the
77. Raskin, supra note 6, at 178 (citing H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 54, reprinted in
1976 U.S.CC.A.N. at 5667-68).
78. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CC.A.N. at 5668-69; see
also LoBello, supra note 64, at 115.
79. H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CCA.N. at 5668-69.
80. See id. at 54, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 5667-68.
81. Id. at 55, reprinted in 1976 U.S.CCA.N. at 5667-68.
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judiciary. Accordingly, judicial interpretations of intrinsic utilita
rian functions must be considered in order to determine what
makes up a useful article subject to the separability test.
2.

Judicial Interpretations

Neither the 1976 Act nor its legislative history provide any in
structions to determine whether utilitarian functions are intrinsic to
particular articles. "Since useful articles are defined as articles
which have an 'intrinsic utilitarian function,' the scope of this defi
nition lies in the interpretation' of what is meant by. 'intrinsic."'82
Generally, courts have considered uses,83 i.e., functions, beyond
portraying appearance or conveying information as intrinsic utilita
rian functions under the 1976 Act.
The first court to examine the language of the 1976 House Re
port was the Second Circuit in Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by
Pearl, Inc. 84 At issue in Kieselstein were designer belt buckles. In
his majority opinion, Judge Oakes noted that "these [were] not or
dinary buckles; they [were] sculptured designs cast in precious met
als-decorative in nature and used as jewelry is ... , principally for
ornamentation."85 The designer of the, belt buckles successfully
registered his belt buckles with the Copyright Office as original
sculptures and designs. 86 The defendant admitted to copying the
designs but asserted that the buckles qualified as "useful articles"
under the 1976 Act and were not entitled to copyright protection
because no "'pictorial, graphic, or sculptural features [I;ould be]
identified separately,'" whether physically or conceptually, from the
'''utilitarian aspects' of the buckles."87
Agreeing with the defendant that the belt buckles were useful
articles, Judge Oakes, however, found protectable design elements
conceptually separable from the utilitarian aspects of the buckles. 88
Unfortunately, Judge Oakes did not discuss any pertinent utilitarian
aspects of the buckles or what intrinsic utilitarian functions sub
sisted in the buckles to qualifY them as useful. art.icles subject to the
separability test. Indeed, the only reference to utility is Judge
82.
83.
ject, [or]
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.

Raskin, supra note 6, at 208 (citation omitted).
"Use" is defined as "a particular service or end," for example, "purpose, ob
function." WEBsrnR's TmRD NEW INT'L DICm)NARY 2523 (1976).
632 F.2d 989 (2d Cir. 1980).
Id. at 990.
See id. at 990-91.
Id. at 991-92.
See id. at 993.
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Oakes' observation that "[t]he primary ornamental aspect of the
[belt] buckles is conceptually separable from their subsidiary utilita
rian function."89 Judge Oakes never stated what constituted this
"subsidiary utilitarian function."
Judge Weinstein did not forget the significance of considering
the utilitarian functions of the buckles in his dissent. "The works
sued on are . . . indubitably belt buckles and nothing else; their
innovations of form are inseparable from the important function
they serve-helping to keep the tops of trousers at waist level. "90
Though his discussion focused on the issue of conceptual separabil
ity, Judge Weinstein cited other examples of what qualified as use
ful articles, including telephones, "piggy-banks," scarves,
dinnerware, lighting fixtures, shoes, watchfaces, socks, and
clothes. 91 Yet, neither Judge Oakes' majority opinion nor Judge
Weinstein's dissenting opinion offer any insight as to what utilita
rian functions are considered intrinsic to the above articles. As a
result, Kieselstein accepts without argument that utilitarian func
tions beyond aesthetic functions are intrinsic to the articles in ques
tion, e.g., that an intrinsic utilitarian function of belt buckles is
keeping pants from falling below waistlines.
Subsequent to Kieselstein, the Second Circuit decided Carol
Barnhart Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp.92 The plaintiff in Barnhart
alleged copyright infringement of four human torso display forms.93
As in Kieselstein, the defendant admitted to copying the plaintiff's
works, but denied liability on the grounds that the mannequins
were utilitarian articles that did not possess separable artistic ele
ments which could be subject to copyright.94 The Second Circuit
agreed, and denied copyright protection because the mannequins
could not satisfy the separability test. 95
Moreover, as in Kieselstein, the court paid small deference to
the question of usefulness. The court accepted without argument
that the plaintiff's works were useful articles as defined in the 1976
Act. 96 Noting that the mannequins' function is to display clothes,
89. Id.
90. Id. at 994 (Weinstein, J., dissenting).
91. Id. at 996 (Weinstein, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
92. 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
93. See id. at 413.
94. See id.
95. See id. at 418-19.
96. See id. at 414-15 ("[s]ince the [mannequins] are concededly useful articles, the
crucial issue in determining their copyrightability is" the question of physical or concep
tual separability).
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the court found no protect able aesthetic or artistic qualities separa
ble from the utilitarian aspects of the articles under the separability
test. 97 Indeed, Judge Newman's dissent emphasized the indisputa
ble nature of the mannequins' usefulness: "each has the 'intrinsic
utilitarian function' of serving as a means of displaying clothing and
accessories to customers of retail stores. "98
The utilitarian function of these articles obviously extends be
yond merely portraying the mannequins' appearance. However,
the court did not discuss why or explain how the function of dis
playing or modeling clothing qualifies as an intrinsic utilitarian
function. Barnhart is a good example of accepting any use-aside
from portraying appearance or conveying information-as an in
trinsic utilitarian function.
Two years later, in Brandir International, Inc. v. Cascade Pa
cific Lumber Co. ,99 the Second Circuit was presented with another
opportunity to examine the definitional scope of intrinsic utilitarian
functions. At issue in Brandir was the copyright ability of bicycle
racks. loo These racks were formed from continuous undulating
pieces of steam pipe bent into form "to permit parking under as
well as over the rack's curves .... Its undulating shape is said ... to
permit double the storage of conventional bicycle racks. "101 The
court held that the bicycle racks, as useful articles, did not satisfy
the separability test and were therefore not subject to copyright.102
Adopting a standard suggested by Professor Denicola,I03 the
court approached the question of copyrightability by examining
"'the relationship between the proffered work and the process of
industrial design."'l04 The court noted "that 'the dominant charac
teristic of industrial design is the influence of nonaesthetic, utilita
rian concerns'" and concluded "that copyrightability 'ultimately
depend[s] on the extent to which the work reflects artistic expres
sion uninhibited by functional considerations. "'105 In other words,
"if design elements reflect a merger of aesthetic and functional con
siderations, the artistic aspects of a work cannot be said to be con
97.
98.

99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

See id. at 418.
[d. at 420 (Newman, J., dissenting).
834 F.2d 1142 (2d Cir. 1987).
See id. at 1143.
[d. at 1146-47.
See id. at 1148.
See generally Denicola, supra note 6, at 741-42.
Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1145 (quoting Denicola, supra note 6, at 741).
[d. (quoting Denicola, supra note 6, at 741).
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ceptually separable from the utilitarian elements."106 The court
approached the problem of copyright ability from a design oriented
perspective, "derogating protection on grounds of functional con
siderations."lo7 Hence, the court recognized the significant role
utilitarian functions play in the analysis of determining the scope of
copyright protection.
The court proceeded to examine the manufacturing history be
hind the development of the bicycle racks.108 The court observed
that the original design of the racks stemmed from wire sculptures
formed from continuous undulating pieces of wire. lo9 The sculp
tures were created and displayed "as a means of personal expres
sion, but apparently were never sold [as works ofart]."110 Their
utilitarian function was not discovered until a bicycle enthusiast
suggested .to the designer that the sculptures could serve as excel
lent bike racks, "permitting bicycles to be parked under the
overloops as well as on top of the underloops."111 The designer
then met with Brandir several times before negotiating a deal to
manufactu.re the design as Brandir RIBBON Racks. 112
Brandir spent some $100,000 on advertising and promotional
literature, targeting architectural and landscaping magazines. 113
RIBBON Racks were featured in Popular Science, Art and Archi
tecture, and Design 384 magazines.1 l4 The design won an Industrial
Designers Society, of America award in the spring of 1980.1 15 More
over, sales of RIBBON Racks exceeded $1.3 million, ranging in
price from $395 to $2,025
for stainless. steel I;I1odels. 116
.,
The court held that the bicycle racks were not copyrightable
because they did not' s~tisfy the separability test.1 l7 In support of its
holding, the court noted, that the design was influenced in signifi
cant measures by utiljtarian concerns. 118 The court stated that
,

[i]n creating the RIBBON Rack, the designer has clearly adapted
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
LoBello, supra note 64, at 124.
See Brandir, 834 F.2d at 1146.
See id.
Id.
111. Id.
112. See id.
113. See id.
114. See id.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 1148.
118. See id. at 1147.
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the original aesthetic elements to accommodate and further a
utilitarian purpose. These altered design features of the RIB
BON Rack, including the spacesaving, open design achieved by
widening the upper loops to permit parking under as well as over
the rack's curves, the straightened vertical elements that allow in
and above-ground installation of the rack, the ability to fit all
types of bicycles and mopeds, and the heavy-gauged tubular con
struction of rustproof galvanized steel, are all features that com
bine to make for a safe, secure, and maintenance-free system of
parking bicycles and mopeds. 119

The court found that "form and function were inextricably inter
twined, ... [t]he design being as much the result of utilitarian pres
sures as aesthetic choices. Indeed, the visually pleasing proportions
and symmetricality of the rack represent design changes made in
response to functional concems."120 Unable to separate artistic ele
ments physically or conceptually from utilitarian aspects, the court
denied copyright protection. 121
The court's analysis of how useful articles develop from origi
nal works of art suggests an approach in determining whether a par
ticular use constitutes an intrinsic utilitarian function of an article
seeking copyright protection. Factors the court examined in deter
mining the usefulness of the racks included: how much the bicycle
racks differed in design from the sculptural wire-work, the utilita
rian reasons behind such design changes, manufacturing considera
tions and materials, advertising costs, how the rack was promoted,
and sales. 122 These factors tend to establish the degree of an arti
cle's functionality in relation to its artistic elements. Hence, under
Brandir, it is possible to draw distinctions between mere utilitarian
functions and intrinsic utilitarian functions because the Second Cir
cuit, as well as Professor Denicola, recognize that functionality ex
ists in various states of degrees. 123
Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp.124 further demonstrates that
simply because articles have uses that go beyond portraying appear
ances or conveying information does not mean that such uses are
intrinsic utilitarian functions of these articles. 125 The Sixth Circuit
in Gay Toys recognized that there is a definitional difference be
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.

Id.
Id.
See id. at 1148.
See id. at 1146-47.
See id. at 1145-48; Denicola, supra note 6, at 741-47.

703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983).
See id. at 973.
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tween utilitarian functions and intrinsic utilitarian functions. The
issue raised on appeal in Gay Toys was whether toys, in this case,
model airplanes, were copyrightable subject matter under the 1976
Act. 126 The district court had asked whether the toy planes pos
sessed any utility, and concluded that "[t]oys are useful."127 "A
plane," the court reasoned, "is a thing to play with. Play is an inte
gral part of growing up. Children need toys. A toy airplane is use
ful and possesses utilitarian and functional characteristics in that it
permits a child to dream and to let his or her imagination soar."128
Finding that toys met the definitional requirements of section 101
of the 1976 Act, the district court held that toys are useful articles
and not copyrightable. 129
The Sixth Circuit began its discussion by reviewing the legisla
tive history of the 1976 Act.130 The court stated that
it might be argued that certain changes made by the 1976 Act
broaden the "useful article" exception. The exception that devel
oped under the 1909 Act disallowed copyright protection to arti
cles whose sole intrinsic function was utility. On the other hand,
the 1976 Act disallows copyright protection to articles which
have an intrinsic utilitarian function.131

The court, however, read Congress' intent to exclude from copy
right protection industrial products such as automobiles, food
processors, and television sets.132 The court said that toys function
more like paintings in that they are to be looked at and enjoyed.B3
"The function of toys is much more similar to that of works of art
than it is to the 'intrinsic utilitarian function' of industrial prod
uctS."134 Acknowledging that toys are meant to be played with, a
use beyond merely portraying appearance or conveying informa
tion, the court declared that not all uses beyond portraying appear
126. See id. at 971.
127. See Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Mich.
1981), rev'd, 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 626-27.
130. See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973. See also supra Part I.B.1 for a discussion of
the 1976 Act's legislative history.
131. Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973-74 (citing Melville B. Nimmer, The Subject Matter
of Copyright Under the Act of1976,24 UCLA L. REv. 978, 1001-03 (1977». See supra
note 68 and accompanying text for a discussion on this point.
132. See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 973 (citing H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 55 (1976),
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5668).
133. See id.
134. Id.
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ances are intrinsic utilitarian functions. Hence, toys are not useful
articles because they "do not even have an intrinsic function other
than the portrayal of the real item" as a matter of law; rather, they
are copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or sculptural workS.135
A year after Gay Toys, the Ninth Circuit decided Poe v. Miss
ing Persons .136 The court in Poe had to decide whether a bathing
suit served as a utilitarian article of clothing or as a copyrightable
sculptural work.13 7 Titled "Aquatint No.5," Gregory Poe described
his swimsuit "as an eccentric and controversial" piece of art and not
clothing. 138 Poe sued for copyright infringement because defend
ants had published a photograph of the swimsuit on an album cover
without Poe's permission.13 9 The defendants conceded that Poe
designed the article, but that as a swimsuit, it was an uncopyright
able useful article. 140 Poe appealed the district court's granting of
the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the grounds that
there existed a disputed issue of material fact as to whether "Aqua
tint No.5" was a utilitarian article of clothing or a copyrightable
work of art.141
On appeal, the defendants cited Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L
Corp.142 to support their position that usefulness is a question of
law and not fact.143 The court, however, distinguished Gay Toys
from the present case by observing that "[n]o factual issue was
presented as to whether the copied articles were toys. The Sixth
Circuit held in Gay Toys that toy airplanes are protectible because
they have no intrinsic utilitarian function other than to portray real
airplanes."144 The issue before the Ninth Circuit was whether Poe
designed a functional swimsuit or a copyrightable pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural work. 145
The court noted that Poe's swimsuit could potentially be used
as an article of clothing based on evidence showing that it was worn
135. Id. at 974 (holding that toys do not have intrinsic functions other than to
portray their own appearances).
136. 745 F.2d 1238 (9th Cir. 1984).
137. See id. at 1239, 1241.
138. Id. at 1240.
139. See id. at 1239.
140. See id.
141. See id.
142. 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir. 1983). See also supra notes 124-35 and accompanying
text for a discussion on Gay Toys.
143. See Poe, 745 F.2d at 1242.
144. Id. at 1242-43.
145. See id. at 1243.
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for modeling purposes. 146 However, the court did not decide
whether Poe "created an article of clothing which can function as a
swimsuit."147 In other words, the court recognized that Poe's swim
suit might possess a "use" beyond portraying its own appearance;
but the court did not decide whether such use constituted an intrin
sic utilitarian function beyond merely portraying appearance. In
stead, the court remanded the case for trial in order to determine
whether Aquatint No. 5 possessed an intrinsic utilitarian function
beyond portraying appearance so as to be considered a useful arti
cle properly subject to the separability test. 148
The Ninth Circuit identified four factors relevant to the ques
tion of usefulness:
(1) expert evidence may be offered concerning the usefulness of
the article and whether any apparent functional aspects can be
separated from the artistic aspects; (2) evidence of Poe's intent in
designing the article may be relevant in determining whether it
has a utilitarian function; (3) testimony concerning the custom
and usage within the art world and the clothing trade concerning
such objects also may be relevant; and (4) the district court may
also consider the admissibility of evidence as to Aquatint No. 5's
marketability as a work of art.149

As in the Brandir case, these factors focus on the degree of func
tionality in relation to artistic elements. Moreover, Poe illustrates
the significance of determining whether particular uses of articles,
perhaps utilitarian in nature, are intrinsic utilitarian functions of the
articles. This question is not decided as a matter of law; rather, it is
more appropriately decided as a question of fact.
In deciding whether animal mannequins constituted useful arti
146. 'see id. at 1241.
147. Id. at 1242.
148. See id. at 1242-43.
149. Id. at 1243 (citing Norris Indus., Inc. v. International Tel. & Tel. Corp., 696
F.2d 918, 922 (11th Cir. 1983) ("useful" articles are those "designed primarily to serve a
utilitarian function"); May v. Morganelli-Heumann & Assocs., 618 F.2d 1363, 1368 (9th
Cir. 1980) (genuine dispute as to custom and usage within architectural profession pre
cludes summary judgment); Saxony Prods. v. Guerlain, Inc., 513 F.2d 716 (9th Cir.
1975) (district court erred in granting summary judgment after conducting a perfume
"sniff test"); Trans-World Mfg. v. AI Nyman & Sons, Inc., 95 F.R.D. 95, 99 (D. Del.
1982) (refusing summary judgment on copyrightability of eyeglass display case, and that
stating "such a conclusion should be made by the trier of fact on the basis of expert
testimony rather than as a matter of law by this Court"); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER,
NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 2.08[B] (1984) (suggesting that courts might look to see if an
article with no utilitarian use would still be marketable to some significant segment of
the community simply because of its aesthetic qualities» (footnote omitted).
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cles, the Fourth Circuit recently had an opportunity to address this
issue as a question of fact in Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan
Chase Taxidermy Supply CO.150 In that case, the defendant argued
that the plaintiff's mannequins were not copyrightable sculptural
works because they possessed "the utilitarian function of acting as
mounts for animal skins for display."151 In determining the useful
ness of plaintiff's mannequins, however, the court noted that the
defendant's argument overlooked the distinction between manne
quins and plastic foam pellet stuffing used in taxidermy.152
A mannequin provides the creative form and expression of the
ultimate animal display, whereas pellets do not. Even though
covered with a skin, the mannequin is not invisible but conspicu
ous in the final display. The angle of the animal's head, the juxta
position of its body parts, and the shape of the body parts in the
final display is little more than the portrayal of the underlying
mannequin. . . . Thus, any utilitarian aspect of the mannequin
exists "merely to portray the appearance" of the animaP53

The court emphasized that the author's portrayal of the animal
form exists in the final product.1 54 "It is the portrayal of the
animal's body expression given by the mannequin that is thus pro
tectable under the Copyright ACt."155 The court found that the
mannequins' usefulness subsisted in their portrayal of the appear
ance of animals. 156 The Fourth Circuit effectively held that the
mannequins' use of acting as mounts for animal skins for display
was insufficient to qualify as an intrinsic utilitarian function.
Although the animal mannequins possessed a utilitarian function
beyond merely portraying appearance, i.e., to act as mounts, the
court found that the mannequins' primary function was to portray
animal expressions and that this function outweighed their utilita
rian function to act as aIiimal skin mounts.
In sum, courts have generally considered articles possessing
uses beyond portraying appearance or conveying information as in
trinsic utilitarian functions making such articles useful articles as
150. 74 F.3d 488 (4th Cir. 1996).
151. [d. at 493.
152. See id. at 493-94.
153. [d. (quoting 17 u.s.c. § 101 (1994)).
154. See id.
155. [d. (citing Masquerade Novelty, Inc. v. Unique Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 663 (3d
Cir. 1990); Rachel v. Banana Republic, Inc., 831 F.2d 1503, 1507 (9th Cir. 1987); Kamar
Int'l, Inc. v. Russ Berrie and Co., 657 F.2d 1059, 1061 (9th Cir. 1981)).
156. See id. at 494.
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defined by the 1976 Act.1 57 Indeed, these courts seemed more than
anxious to assume usefulness 158 so as to grapple with the concept of
separability. On the other hand, some courts recognize that simply
because certain articles possess utilitarian functions does not mean
such functions are intrinsic to those articles. 159 The challenge, then,
is to strike a balance between these extremes to determine what
constitute intrinsic utilitarian functions.
One approach to this inquiry is "to err" in favor of over-pro
tection. 160 Unfortunately, broadening the scope of protection,
when unnecessary, undermines the goals of copyright protection
because it comes at the expense of public welfare. 161 Gay Toys is a
good example of over-protection. Gay Toys could be broadly read
to suggest that toys are copyrightable pictorial, graphic, or sculp
tural works as a matter of law because they do not possess an intrin
sic utilitarian function other than to portray appearance. 162 Poe
suggests, however, that determining whether something should
properly be defined as useful is not a question of law; rather, it is a
question of fact.1 63 The question remains, however, as to how in
trinsic utilitarian functions are defined.
Moreover, neither the 1976 Act nor its legislative history pro
vide any instructions to determine whether particular uses qualify
as intrinsic utilitarian functions. The judiciary has also been unsuc
cessful in establishing guidelines to determine whether articles pos
sessing utilitarian functions constitute intrinsic utilitarian functions.
Hence, this paper suggests the following analysis to determine the
definitional scope of intrinsic utilitarian functions in relation to arti
cles seeking copyright protection.

II.

ANALYSIS

Distinguishing art from useful articles is inevitably subjective
157. See supra note 66 and cases cited therein.
158. In other words, courts have seemed more than anxious to assume that most
articles possess an intrinsic utilitarian function beyond portraying appearance or con
veying information so that they may address the issue of separability.
159. See, e.g., Superior Form, 74 F.3d at 493 (finding mannequin use as animal
skin mount insufficient to qualify as intrinsic utilitarian function); Poe v. Missing Per
sons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 1984); Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 703 F.2d
970, 973-74 (6th Cir. 1983).
160. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 6, at 209-10.
161. See supra notes 18-20 and accompanying text.
162. See Gay Toys, 703 F.2d at 974 ("[T]oys do not even have an intrinsic function
other than the portrayal of the real item.").
163. See Poe, 745 F.2d at 1242-43.
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and arbitrary.l64 Congress has evidenced, however, its concern that
granting copyright protection to useful articles would stifle progress
in the arts and sciences. 165 Copyright protection grants copyright
owners exclusive rights,166 and protecting functional aspects of use
ful articles would effectively deliver a monopoly to the owners over
their respective articles. This would have a chilling effect on others
to create and contribute to the arts and sciences. 167 This result is
contrary to the ultimate goals of copyright legislation in that the
purpose of copyright is to promote art and science for public wel
fare. 168 Protecting the rights of authors is seen as a necessary
means for such promotion. 169 "Without assurance of protection,
many authors would be discouraged from creative activity, and pro
gress would lag."170 Authors are encouraged to create for the pub
lic benefit because they are assured of receiving the fruits of their
labors by granting them exclusive rights in their works for a limited
term.171
The challenge is striking a balance between granting enough
protection to encourage creation and too much protection which
discourages, indeed, may prohibit others from pursuing their own
efforts in a similar field. l72 "The law concerning the protection of
useful articles has shown just how difficult this balancing can be
come, especially when commercial products are involved and much
of the economy depends on competition within commercial
fields."173 Therefore, before determining the appropriate scope of
copyright protection, the first step in balancing the interests be
tween public progress and authors' rights is to define whether the
164. See, e.g., Raskin, supra note 6, at 195.
165. See H.R. REp. No. 94-1476, at 54-55 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
5659, 5667-69; see also Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d
Cir. 1985); Raskin, supra note 6, at 195.
166. 17 U.S.c. § 106 (1994).
167. See Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954); 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER, NIM·
MER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.03[A) (1994); Raskin, supra note 6, at 195.
168. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (Congress has the power to "promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and In
ventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries ... ").
169. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, supra note 167, § 1.03[A); Raskin,
supra note 6, at 195-96.
170. Raskin, supra note 6, at 196; see also Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; NIMMER, supra
note 167, § 1.03[A).
171. See Mazer, 347 U.S. at 219; REpORT ON THE GENERAL REVISION, supra note
15, at 3-6; NIMMER, supra note 167, § 1.03[A).
172. See Raskin, supra note 6, at 196.
173. Raskin, supra note 6, at 196 (footnote omitted).

166

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 20:143

article seeking protection is a pictorial, graphic, or sculptural work
or a useful article under the 1976 Act.
For example, the Sixth Circuit approached this question by
weighing the usefulness of toy airplanes against their aesthetic ap
peal in Gay Toys. The court recognized that "a toy airplane is to be
played with and enjoyed, but a painting of an airplane, which is
copyrightable, is to be looked at and enjoyed."174 Observing that
"[t]he intention of Congress was to exclude from copyright protec
tion industrial products such as automobiles, food processors, and
television sets,"175 the court analogized "[t]he function of toys ... to
that of works of art" because "toys do not even have an intrinsic
function other than the portrayal of the real item. "176
The holding in Gay Toys, however, could be read overly inclu
sive as granting too much protection by categorizing all toys as
proper subject matter warranting copyright protection. Under the
Sixth Circuit's analysis, one is hard pressed to find any toy that
might qualify as a useful article, because the court held as a matter
of law that the only intrinsic function of toys is to portray appear
ance. 177 Basing copyright protection as to an entire class of articles
is inconsistent with the basic premises of copyright protection. 178
Such a ruling undermines the purpose of copyright law because it
comes at the expense of promoting the public interest.1 79
Drawing an analytical starting point before addressing the ap
propriate scope of an article's copyright protection is analogous to
Judge Oakes' analysis concerning conceptual separability in Kiesel
174. GayToys, 703 F.2d at 973..
175. Id. (emphasis added).
176. Id. at 973-74.
177. See id. Moreover, in a 1910 regulation defining "works of art" under the
1909 Act, the Copyright Office declared that "[n]o copyright exists in toys, games, [or]
dolls." COPYRIGHT OFFICE RULES AND REGULATIONS FOR THE REGISTRATION OF
CLAIMS TO COPYRIGHT, BULL. No. 15, § 12(g) (1910); see also Denicola, supra note 6,
at 710 n.20 .
. 178. Cf. Note, supra note 21, at 1525. "[A]ny attempt to base copyright on a
generalization as to an entire functional class seems inconsistent with the growing rec
ognition that even the most narrowly utilitarian objects, if imaginatively designed, can
be a source of aesthetic pleasure." Id. Indeed, there may exist toys whose "sole intrin
sic function" is that of utility. For example, the KOOSH ball in OddzOn Products, Inc.
v. Oman, 924 F.2d 346, 346 (D.C. Cir. 1991), was found to have been developed "to
teach youngsters with poor eye-to-hand coordination how to play catch." Id. at 347.
Though not raised on appeal, the court raised the question as to how the toy might be
properly defined, i.e., as a useful article or as a copyrightable sculptural work. See id. at
350.
179. See supra notes 15-17, 165-71 and accompanying text.
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stein-Cord.1 80 In addressing this question, Judge Oakes suggested
that if aesthetic features are "primary," then conceptual separabil
ity exists.181 Similarly, shifting this inquiry to usefulness and deter
mining that aesthetic qualities are primary,182 may weigh against
finding the article seeking copyright protection to be useful. In
short, under a "primary functional significance" analysis, if an arti
cle's primary functionality is aesthetic rather than utilitarian, then
the article should properly be defined as a: pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work warranting copyright protection.1 83 Conversely, if
an article's utilitarian considerations outweigh its aesthetic quali
ties, the article should be defined under the 1976 Act as an unpro
tectable useful article.
The analysis begins by examining the specific article seeking
copyright protection in order to define the article as a pictorial,
graphic, or sculptural work or a us~ful article. The Copyright Of
fice or courts should first consider potential functions of the article,
i.e., whether uses of the article include aesthetic or utilitarian func
tions or both. For example, the district court in Gay Toys held that
a utilitarian function of toy airplanes was to allow children to play,
dream, and let their imaginations soar.1 84 Another example is the
argument in Superior Form that animal mannequins, similar to the
human mannequins in Carol Barnhari?85 function as mounts for
animal skins for display.186 These uses extend beyond the defini
tion of "merely to portray the appearance of the article."187
The next step is ascertaining whether the article seeking copy
right protection is "in fact" a useful article, i.e., the question be
comes whether the "use" in question qualifies as an intrinsic
utilitarian function beyond portraying appearance or conveying in
formation. 188 This is accomplished by weighing the significance of
180. See Kieselstein-Cord v. Accessories by Pearl, Inc., 632 F.2d 989, 993 (2d Cir.
1980).
181. Id.
182. See Raskin, supra note 6, at 208.
183. Note, however, that "fj]udges will then have to determine either through the
ordinary observer or the designer's intent, which quality was primary and which was
secondary." Raskin, supra note 6, at 208 n.274.
184. See Gay Toys, Inc. v. Buddy L Corp., 522 F. Supp. 622, 625 (E.D. Mich.
1981), rev'd, 703 F.2d 970 (6th Cir . 1983).
185. Carol Barnhart, Inc. v. Economy Cover Corp., 773 F.2d 411 (2d Cir. 1985).
186. See Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74
F.3d 488, 493 (4th Cir. 1996).
187. 17 U.S.c. § 101 (1994).
188. As noted, most courts until recently Considered any use beyond portraying
appearance or conveying information as an intrinsic utilitarian function. Superior
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an article's "artistic or aesthetic" functionality against its "intrinsic
utilitarian" functionality. Balancing an article's various "uses"
against each other helps identify the degree of the article's utilita
rian use because it measures the relative weight and importance of
aesthetic functionality versus utilitarian functionality. The difficulty
is deciding at which point any particular use becomes "an intrinsic
utilitarian function" under the 1976 Act. 189
Apportioning the relative weight of aesthetic functionality and
utilitarian functionality necessarily occurs on an ad hoc basis.190
Although a case-by-case analysis maintains a subjective fiavor,l9l
the Copyright Office and courts could rely on concrete factors al
ready examined in previous cases to help determine whether spe
cific items seeking copyright protection qualify as pictorial, graphic,
or sculptural works or useful articles. 192 These factors, albeit not
dispositive, tend to establish the degree of an article's utilitarian
function in relation to its aesthetic appeal.
For example, in addressing the issue of separability, the court
in Brandir considered the similarities and differences between the
design of the article seeking protection from other articles having
the same or similar use. 193 It considered the reasons behind these
Form, Gay Toys, and Poe stand for the proposition that this principle is not necessarily
true, i.e., simply because an article possesses an additional utilitarian function beyond
portraying appearance does not mean that such use should be considered an intrinsic
utilitarian function. See supra note 66 and cases cited therein.
This paper's suggested approach to the issue of defining an article seeking copy
right protection considers both notions. It recognizes that neither the 1976 Act, its leg
islative history, nor case law have ever precisely defined "intrinsic utilitarian function"
as this term is used in its statutory context, see supra Part I.B, while at the same time
qualifying the definitional scope of "intrinsic utilitarian function" to exclude any use
beyond portraying appearance or conveying information and only including an article's
use that is primarily and significantly utilitarian rather than aesthetic in nature. This is
accomplished by weighing an article's aesthetic and utilitarian functions against each
other. An article's appropriate definition turns on whether aesthetic or utilitarian con
siderations outweigh the other. Hence, in keeping with Superior Form, Gay Toys, and
Poe, an article can possess both aesthetic and utilitarian functions and receive copyright
protection under the 1976 Act because it is properly defined as a pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural work even though the article possesses an additional use beyond merely por
traying appearance or conveying information.
189. See supra note 188.
190. See Raskin, supra note 6, at 209.
191. See id. Compare Justice Holmes' famous copyright caveat: "It would be a
dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious
limits." Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 251 (1903).
192. See supra Part I.B.2.
193. See Brandir Int'!, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co., 834 F.2d 1142, 1146-47
(2d Cir. 1987).
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design changes also relevant. 194 The court examined the overall
cost of manufacturing the article compared to its functional costs
alone. 195 It looked to consumer response and use of the article,
manufacturing considerations, and the type of materials used for
the article. 196 These factors reflect whether the article's design was
significantly influenced by utilitarian considerations. 197
The court in Brandir held that the bicycle racks seeking protec
tion went through a transformation from an originally copyright
able sculptural work to unprotectable useful articles because the
utilitarian considerations in producing the racks outweighed their
aesthetic considerations. 198 The original design was changed to ac
commodate bicycle storage. 199 The type of material used in the
original sculpture was changed to galvanized steel to survive in
clement weather. 2°O The court noted that consumers saw bicycle
racks rather than sculptural artwork. 201 The court determined that
the use which extended beyond merely portraying appearance, i.e.,
the use as a bicycle storage rail, was sufficient enough to be defined
as an intrinsic utilitarian function. Hence, the bicycle racks, which
were seeking copyright protection, were defined as useful articles
subject to the separability test because their utilitarian functionality
outweighed any aesthetic considerations.
Similarly, the court's challenge in Poe was determining
whether Poe designed a "functional swimsuit or a work of art"
before ascertaining the appropriate scope of copyright protec
tion. 202 Noting that "[t]he evidence presented by both sides at the
hearing on the motion for a summary judgment shows that Poe was
attempting to create a work of art which portrayed an article of
clothing,"203 the court concluded that a genuine issue of material
fact existed because it was unclear to what extent Poe's "swimsuit"
could be "used" as such, i.e., whether Poe's swimsuit was by defini
tion a useful article under the 1976 Act. Remanding the case for
trial, the court established four factors relevant to the question of
usefulness.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 1147.
Poe v. Missing Persons, 745 F.2d 1238, 1243 (9th Cir. 1984).
[d. at 1242.
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First, the Ninth Circuit said that expert evidence is relevant in
determining whether an article possesses an intrinsic utilitarian
function. 204 Second, in subscribing to Professor Denicola's ap
proach, the court said that evidence of the author's intent in design
ing the article may indicate the degree of its utilitarian functions,z05
Third, evidence of custom and usage concerning the article in ques
tion within the art world may be relevant. 206 Finally, evidence con
cerning the article's marketability as a work of art should be
considered. 207
Under a "primary functional significance" analysis, the Fourth
Circuit in Superior Form, for example, could have weighed the use
fulness of the animal mannequins against their aesthetic appeal by
considering the above enumerated factors in Brandir and Poe. The
Fourth Circuit emphasized the mannequins' importance in portray
ing the ultimate expressive aspects of the final product. 208 "Even
though covered with a skin, the mannequin is not invisible but con
spicuous in the final display."209 In determining whether this qual
ity was principally influenced by aesthetic or utilitarian
considerations, the court could have examined the similarities and
differences between the design of the animal mannequins and other
manneqUIns.
The court was quick to point out, for example, that the human
mannequins in Carol Barnhart, which were held to be uncopyright
able useful articles, were primarily "used to display clothes for com
mercial sale . . . and were not designed for portraying
themselves."210 The Fourth Circuit concluded that the Second Cir
cuit did not find that the author in Carol Barnhart "fixed a mode of
expression in a tangible form for the purpose of displaying or por
traying the article," i.e., the primary function was not aesthetic;
rather, it was utilitarian. 211
Conversely, the court in Superior Form found that the animal
mannequins were "intended to give body expression to the final dis
plays and to constitute a permanent portrayal of the animal."212 In
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
F.3d 488,
209.

See id. at 1243.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See Superior Form Builders, Inc. v. Dan Chase Taxidermy Supply Co., 74
493-94 (4th Cir. 1996).
Id. at 494.
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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support of this contention, the court could have relied on evidence
of the author's intent to create a copyrightable sculptural work, evi
dence concerning the animal mannequins' marketability as sculp
tural works to show aesthetic significance, and evidence of
consumer response, i.e., whether consumers purchased the animal
mannequins primarily for aesthetic reasons. These factors indicate
whether the mannequins' designs were significantly influenced by
artistic considerations and whether the mannequins' principal func
tion was primarily aesthetic. 213
Though the mannequins served a utilitarian function as mounts
for animal skin displays; the court concluded that the principal utili
tarian aspect was to "portray the appearance" of the animal.2 14 The
usefulness of the animal mannequins as mounts did not outweigh
their aesthetic features and qualities. Hence, the animal manne
quins were defined as sculptural works properly warranting copy
right protection.
The above factors are germane considerations in determining
the significance of an article's aesthetic. or utilitarian qualities.
These factors tend to establish whether an article's' particular use
stems principally from utilitarian considerations rather than aes
thetic appeal and whether form and function are inextricably inter
twined. 215 These factors also help explain the degree of an article's
utilitarian use because they identify the relative weight of aesthetic
functionality versus utilitarian functionality. IIi short, the difficulty
of deciding at which point "use" becomes "an intrinsic utilitarian
function" under a "primary functional significance" anaiysis is more
clearly focused when examined as a question of fact on an ad hoc
basis after considering the factors discussed in both Brandir and
Poe.
CONCLUSION

Under the 1976 Copyright Act, "pictorial, graphic, and sculp
tural" works are proper subject matter warranting copyright protec
213. ct. Brandir Int'l, Inc. v. Cascade Pac. Lumber Co, 834F.2d 1142, 1147 (2d
Cir. 1987). The Second Circuit found that form and function were inextricably inter
twined, the design of the bicycle racks at issue "being as much the result of utilitarian
pressures as aesthetic choices.... [D]esign changes [were] made in response to func
tional concerns." [d. at 1147. Hence, utilitarian considerations outweighed aesthetic
functionality to define the bicycle racks as useful articles.
.
214. [d.
215. See id. at 1147 (stating that when form and function are inextricably inter
twined, separability does not exist).
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tion. The exception to this rule is that the designs of useful articles
are not copyrightable except to the extent that pictorial, graphic, or
sculptural design features may physically or conceptually exist sepa
rately from the articie. Useful articles are defined as having an in
trinsic utilitarian function beyond portraying appearance or
conveying information. So long as articles possess "an intrinsic util
itarian function," they are defined as useful and their designs are
not copyrightable unless particular elements of their designs satisfy
the separability test. Unfortunately, the 1976 Act and its legislative
history do not provide instructions to determine what constitute in
trinsic utilitarian functions. Moreover, the judiciary has been un
successful in establishing guidelines on how to answer this question.
Because the purpose of copyright law is to promote the arts
and sciences for public benefit, the appropriate scope of copyright
protection turns on defining the specific article seeking protection
and not on a general categorization of the article. Whether particu
lar articles possess intrinsic utilitarian functions is a question of fact
and not a question of law. Indeed, some articles presently afforded
copyright protection may properly be defined as useful articles be
cause they possess intrinsic utilitarian functions beyond portraying
appearance.
Determining whether a particular use qualifies as an intrinsic
utilitarian function should be done on an ad hoc basis under a "pri
mary functional significance" analysis by considering the relevant
factors discussed in Brandir and Poe. This permits the Copyright
Office and courts to weigh the interests of authors against public
progress. Rather than favoring over-protection, as illustrated in
Gay Toys, and holding that certain categories of articles, for exam
ple, toys, do not possess intrinsic utilitarian functions beyond por
traying appearance as a matter of law, a case-by-case analysis to
determine "usefulness" protects the interests of authors, the public
welfare, and establishes clearer guidelines to address future issues
of this nature.

